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In the Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

Case No.

C. H. CHEALEY,
Defendant Jnd Appellant

RESPONDENT,S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District
Court of the State of Utah in and for Salt Lake County,
Honorable Will L. Hoyt presiding, in which case the defen.dant, C. H. Chealey, was convicted by a jury of the crime
of involuntary manslaughter.
The complaint was filed in the City Court on the 25th
day of October, 1939, charging the defendant with the crime
of involuntary manslaughter as follows:
""That C. H. Chealey on the 16th day of Sep-tember, A. D. 1939, at the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, did commit the crime of involuntary
manslaughter as follows, to.-wit: That the said
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C. H. Chealey at the time and place aforesaid killed
Harlan Junior Kofold without malice."'
The defendant after a preliminary hearing was regular-ly bound over to the district court to stand trial on the
offense. The information in the case was filed on the 1st
day of December, 1939, by the District Attorney. On
December 2, 1939, the defenda:nt was arrainged, waived time
in which to plead and entered a plea of ""not guilty."" The
case came on for trial on the 22nd day of January, 1940.
The evidence showed that the defendant C. H. Chealey
at the time charged in the complaint was driving a truck
north on U. S. highway 91, south of Salt Lake City; that
as he approached the Draper cross roads he ran the truck off
the road with the result that the truck tipped over killing
one Harlan Junior Kofold, who was at the time riding on the
rack at the back of the truck.
The evidence in the case clearly shows that the defen-dant had been drinking. He had driven the car on the day
in question from Centerfi•eld, Utah, bringing with him a
minor, Donald Beck. Beck testified that they picked up a
number of hitchhikers along the way, among them the de-ceased, Kofold, and one Luther Smith. The evidence shows
that they stopped at Nephi, Utah, where the defendant and
Smith drank some beer in a store, and also purchased a pint
bottle of Gold Bond Whisk!ey which was consumed by the
defendant and Smith by the time they reached Pleasant
Grove. At Pleasant Grove they purchased another pint
bottle of Gold Bond Whiskey, of which a portion was con-sumed at the time of the accident.
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The evidence shows that the weather at the time of the
accident was good, and the road was dry. The evidence
presented by the State indicates that the road was clear,
and that there were no other cars approaching the truck
driven by the defendant. The defendant and Smith, who
was riding with him in the cab, both testified that it was
necessary for the defendant to drive the car off the road in
order to avoid hitting an oncoming car which was attempting
to pass a second oncoming car, and so was in the wrong lane
of traffic. However, .impeaching testimony was introduced
by the State showing that Smith, while he was in the hospital
before the trial, had made the statement that he knew
nothing about how the accident occured because he was
asleep in the cab at the time. Evidence was also presented
by the State to the effect that the defendant immediately
after the accident showed obvious signs of intoxication.
ARGUMENT I
THE COURT MADE NO ERROR IN REFUSING
TO DISMISS EDWIN BLISS FROM THE JURY ON A
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE.
Defendant's first assignment of error is that the court
erred in refusing to sustain the defendant's challenge to a
juror, Edwin Bliss, an the ground that Bliss was biased
against persons driving after they had been drinking.
In answer to the question as to whether or not any of
the jurors had any prejudice or scruples against a man taking
a drink, Bliss replied, ....1 distinctly believe a man should not
drink that drives an automobile.,,
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On subsequent questions the Court asked, '"'"Wauld the
fact that def•endant was a drinking man cause you to have
any prejudice?"
Bliss replied, HAbsolutely not.,,
The Court then asked, '""In this case although the State
might show the defendant had imbibed liquor to the extent
that his mental faculties were a little less alert, if you were
not satisfiied by the evidence in the case as to how intoxi-cating liquor affects q. man would you be inclined to hold
the defendant guilty because of this present notion as to
the eff•ect intoxicating liquor has on a man?''
Bliss replied, HCertainly not."
The court then asked in effect if the evidence showed
that the defendant had been drinking but there was a con-flict of evidence as to whether he had consumed enough liquor
to affect the method in which he drove the automobile, if the
juror would give the defendant the benefit of the doubt.
To this Bliss r•eplied, '""The defendant would be entitled to
the doubt.''
There is nothing contained in any of Bliss's statements
which would indicate that he had any prejudice or bias which
would render him unfit for jury service in this case. It is
true he stated that he had a prejudice against m.en drinking
when they wefie driving automobiles, and on questioning
stated, '""I don't think a man should drink that drives an
automobile." This was merely an expression of an opinion
which it is to be hoped is shared by the majority of th'z
citizens of the State of Utah.
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On subsequent questioning for the purpose of clarifying
his statements and giving the Court and counsel full under..
standing of his position on the matter, Bliss definitely stated
that he had Iio prejudice which would prevent him from
rendering a fair decision in the case and that he would give
the defendant the benefit of the doubt wherever conflict in
testimony occured .as to whether or not the defendant had
consumed sufficient liquor to affect the manner in which he
operated his automobile.
The defendant maintains that this case is comparable
to the case of State of Montana vs. Huffman, 296, Pac. 789.
In that case, the Supreme Oourt refused to reverse a case
because the trial court dismissed a juror who had indicated
a definite bias but who had later contradicted his position.
An examination of the facts in that case, however, indicate
that it is not at all comparable to the case at bar. In that
case it appeared that the juror was a friend of the accused
and was asked if he believed the defendant were guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt under the law, if he would vote
to convict him. To this question the juror replied, ""No
sir . " Later the juror reversed his position, but the court
nevertheless excused him.
The appellate court did not pass directly upon the prop..
osition as to whether the juror should have been excused
or not. It is indicated, however, that the trial court did
commit error in excusing the juror on these grounds, but the
court stated, ""Here, we are asked to apply that rule to the
action of the court in excusing a prospective juror although
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the reoord does not disclose that an impartial jury was not
thereafter obtained. Under the circumstances shown, there
is no ground for reversal even though we concede that the
court committed a technical error ..,.,
The defendant cites two Utah cases, State of Utah vs.
Nell, 23 Utah 541, and State of Utah vs. Seybolt, 65 Utah
204, in support of his position. N·either of these cases has
any bearing upon the point at issue. In the case of State
vs. Neel the juror was excused on the ground that he had
formed an opinion 11egarding the merits of the case at trial.
Ther·e is no evidence in this case indicating that juror Bliss
had formed an opinion or even knew anything about the
facts of the case upon which he was called to sit.
In State vs. Seybolt, the t juror was excused for no
apparent cause which this court held was an abuse of the
trial court"s discretion. This court refused, however, to
reverse the case upon the ground expressed in the following
reasoning of the court:
""It has been often held by this court that in
this jurisdiction prejudice is not presumed from
~error."'
(See one of the latest cases, State vs. Nell,
59 Utah 68, 202 P. 7.) The statutes of the state
(Comp. Laws 1917, Section 9231), expressly declare
that this court in criminal cases on appeal must give
judgment without regard to errors which have not
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. It is further
provided that, if error has been committed, it shall
be not presumed vo· have resulted in a miscarriage of
justice, and that the court must be satisfied that it
has before it is warranted in reversing the judgment.
The statute is revolutionary in its effect in that it
entirely abrogates the old rule under which if error
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was found prejudice was presumed. It has now
become the duty of this court in criminal cases, on
appeal, to go further than the mere finding of error.
It must be satisfied that the error is prejudicial
before it is warranted in reversing the judgment.,,
The great weight of authority is to the effect that a
mere bias or prejudice against crime or a particular type of
crime is not sufficient grounds for challenge of a juror. 35
C.]. 329 reads:
"The fact that a person is prejudiced against the
sale of intoxicating liquors does not render him in-competent as a juror on the trial of a .liquor dealer
for an offense having no relation to such business, nor
is a juror necessarily incompetent by reason of such
prejudice in a criminal prosecution for a violation
of the liquor law.,
In the case of Page vs. State, 27 S. W. (2d) 219, the
court stated:
""Bill of exception No. 2 presents as error the
action of the court in overruling appellant,s challenge
for cause to Juror Busby and being forced to exer-cise a premptory challeng•e on said juror. The
effect of this bill is to show that this juror with many
others had signed a statement commending the efforts
of the sheriff,s department in •enforcing the law and
suppressing the liquor traffic. It is sufficient to show
a bias of the juror in favor of the prohibition law and
a prejudice against liquor law violators. This is not
sufficient to disqualify the juror where the juror, as
in this case, answered that he had no predjuice against
the defendant nor against people charged with viola-tion of the liquor law nor any opinion that would
affect his verdict.,,
The facts in that case are substantially the same as those
in the case now being considered.
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All of the cases quoted by the defendant in support of
his position are cases which hold that the court committed
no error in excusing jurors when certain bias was shown.
It does not follow that the court would have committed an
error in the same circumstances if it had refused to excuse
the juror. To contend for such a position would be to hold
that there is no discretion in the trial court at all, and that
anything which the court may do, it must do. Further.
more, even if one were to concede that the court committed
a technical error in this case, there is no showing that such
error in a:ny way p!iejudiced the substantial rights of the
defendant. The re~ord shows that a peremptory challenge
was taken to Bliss, and there is no evidence to show that a
fair and impartial jury was not obtained to sit upon the case.
In view of the language of this court quoted above from the
case of State vs. Seybolt, in the absence of such a showing,
even though error were committed, it would not be grounds
for reversal.
ARGUMENT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING DE.
PENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK
OF CASUAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE UN.
LAWFUL ACT AND THE DEATH OF THE DE.
CEASED OR IN REFUSING THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
As defendant's a?signment of error relating to the re'
fusal of the court to grant a dismissal and his assignment
regarding the refusal of the court to direct a verdict rely
upon the same points, they will here be considered together.
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The State agrees with the position stated by the de,
fendant in the first part of his argument on these points;
that the death must have been the natural and proximate
result of the unlawful act in order for the defendant to be
convicted of manslaughter. The State, however, does not
agree with the position to which the defense finds its way in
the latter part of the argument, namely that the death must
have been a naturafand necessary result of the unlawful act
in order for conviction to be sustained. If it were requived
that death be the necessary result of the wrongful act, seldom
if ever would it be possible to obtain a conviction for homicide
of any kind. Even the most grievious wound inflicted
deliberately and intentionally will not necessarily result in
the death ,of the person injured. A person might very con'
ceivably recover. However, death would certainly be a
natural and proximate result of the infliction of such a
wound. No wher.e in the case of Porter vs. State, 70 N. E.
129, which defendant relies upon for his contention that
death must have been a necessary result, has the State been
able to find such a holding or even such an implication by
the Indiana Oourt. The court does state as follows:
""It must appear that the homicide was a natu,
ral or necessary result of the act of the appellant in
carrying the revolver in violation of statute."
It should be observed, howev'er, that the words ""natural"
and c.~onecessary '' are used in the disjunctive ~nd not in the con,
junctive.
In that case the defendant was carrying a gun con,
trary to the statutes of the state, which gun was discharged
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during a friendly scuffle with the deceased, the bullet strik.
ing and killing the deceased. The court properly refused
to sustain a conviction because the act of carrying a gun'
which was the unlawful act alleged, was not the proximate
cause of the death of the deceased. The proximate cause
of cleat~ of the deceased was the friendly scuffle which re..
suited in the discharge of the gun, which act was not un.lawful and could not sustain a conviction.
In the case of People vs. Barnes, 148 N. W. 400, also
relied upon by defendant, the case was rev·ersed because of
an instruction given by the court to the effect that if the
jury found that the defendant- was driving an automobile
more than ten miles per hour at the time the fatal collision
occurred, they should find him guilty. The court pointed out
there that ten miles an hour was not an unreasonable or un"
safe speed, and that the accident might just as well have
happened if the defendant had been going nine miles an hour
as if he had been going eleven miles an hour. Furthermore
the court pointed out that the deceased stepped in front of
the car, and the court implies that the deceased"s negligence
was the proximate cause of the death.
In order for an act to be a proximate cause of an in.-t
jury it is not necessary that the injury would neces.
sarily follow frqm the act or even that the person acting
negligently should be able to see that the precise type of injury
might occur as a result of the act. It is sufficient if a person
of ordinary caution and prudence would have been able to
forsee that some injury would liroely result from the act, not
necessarily that the specific injury would result from the act.
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Neiswender vs. Topeka Township, (Kan.) 79 P (2d)
839; Railway Co. vs Parry (Kan.) 73 P. 105; Hartnett vs.
Boston Store of Chicago, (Ill.) 106 N. E. 837; Smith vs.
Lampe, 64 Fed. (2d) 201; Handleys vs. Texas and Pacific
Coal Co. (Tex.) 207 S. W. 375; Cleveland C. C. & St.
L. R. Oo. vs. Tauer (Ind.) 96 N. E. 758; Voshall: wf.
Northern Pacific Terminal Co., (Ore.) 240 P. 891.
It is of course necessary that the unlawful act directly
caused or set in motion a chain of events uninterrupted by
any independent unforeseeable event, which caused the in-jury or death. Applying these tests to the case at issue there
can be little doubt that an unlawful act of the defendant
was the proximate cause of the death of Harlan Junior Ko-fold. The jury from the evidence presented might very well
have found that the defendant was driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, or they might very well
have found that he operated his vehicle carelessly and negli. .
gently, and with disregard of the safety of others in that he
drove the vehicle off the road at a place where the road
was clear of other traffic at sufficient speed that the truck
hit the shoulder of the road and tipped over.

An examination of the evidence leaves little doubt that
there was sufficient evidence on which the jury might have
made either of these findings. In regard to the drunkenness
of the defendant, we have testimony from both defense wit.nesses that he had been drinking. Furthermore, we have
the testimony of the State"s witness, Shieh, that the de.fendant was obviously drunk some minutes after the acci--
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dent when he was taken to the County Jail. The defend.ant makes the claim that Shieh, s testimony on this point
1s contrary to the testimony of another State, s witness, Mr.
Kinney. However, an examination of the record does not
sustain this point. Shieh, s testimony was to the effect that
the defendant was confused as to the direction he was
driving. This is corroborated by Kinney. The fact that Shieh
said the defaendant was incoherent, while Kinney stated he
aS able to understand him, indicates no conflict. There
are various degrees of incoherency. A man may merely
be difficult to understand or it may be impossible to under.stand him.
7
\\

As to the condition of the highway at the time the
accident occurred, the State produced two witnesses who
were there at the time who testified that they saw no traf.
:fie on the highway at the time or immediately preceding
the accident. The testimony of the defendant, s witness
Smith that he saw a California car approaching, which
forced the defendant to turn out to miss it, was completely
impeached by evidence as to Smith,s prior inconsistent state.
ments, while the jury evidently chose, as well they might, to
disbelieve the testimony of the defendant in this regard. It
can scarcely be claimed, therefore, that there was not suf..
ficient evidence upon which the jury might base a finding
either of drunken driving or gross and culpable negligence.
ARGUMENT III
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
PERMITTING THE WITNESS, LEROY D. WIL.-
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LIAMS, TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT ON HAND.WRITING.
The defendant in attacking the qualifications of the
State"s witness, Leroy D. Williams, to testify as a hand..
writing expert seems to proceed on the theory that it is nee..
essary for a person to attend a special school wher•e hand..
writing is studied in order to qualify as an expert. The de..
fendant quotes from Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, Sec..
tion 369, as follows:
""An expert must have made the subject upon
which he gives his opinion a matter of particular
study, practice, or observation and he must have par..
ticular and special knowledge on the subject ..,.,
The next sentence, which they omitted from the ar..
gument, reads:.
""While it is clear that the witness in order to
be competent as an expert must show himself to be
skilled in the business or profession to which the
subject relates, there is no precise rule as to the
mode in which such skill or experience must be ac..
quired. Thus the witness may have become qualified
by actual experience or long observation without
having made a study of the subject ..,.,
In the case of In Re Burbank, 93 N. Y. Sup. 866, the
court describes a handwriting expert as:
""Any person who has had such experience in
the examination of handwriting as to enable him to
note and distinguish the characteristics of handwrit..
tng.
In Griffin vs. Working Womens" Association, 151
Ala. 604, in discussing the problem of •expert testimony as
to handwriting, the oourt states:
•

'1'1
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""To legalize such testimony the witness must be
first shown to be an expert, that is accustomed to and
skilled in the matter of handwriting genuine and
spurtous.
With this standard or rule the question of com.petency of the witness seems to be one addressed to
the sound judgment and discretion of the court, and
its ruling is not reviewable on appeal unless there
is shown an abuse of this discretion.''
In the case at issue the witness Williams testified. that
for four years while working for the State Liquor Commis.sion it had been his responsibility to compare handwritings,
and that during this time he had been called upon to giv~
his opinion as to handwriting, a:nd that he had testified re.
garding such matters in courts of record. For the six years
previous to that he had been in charge of files for the Union
Pacific Railroad where he had occasion to use his knowledge
of handwriting very extensively. The def•endant bases his as.
signment of error solely upon the statement of the witness
on cross examination that he had no special training, but had
just picked up his skill as an expert in handwriting. The
State submits that in view of the above cited authorities spe.
cial training is not necessary, and that such skill can very
w·ell be gained by experience. The matter of whether or not
the witness should have been permitted to testify is a matter
which was within the discretion of the trial court, and there
is nothing to indicate an abuse of that discretion.
Furthermore, if it should be held that the court was in
error in admitting Williams' testimony, such testimony can,
not be ~eld to have impaired the substantial rights of the de.
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fendant. Williams, testimony merely went to prove that
handwriting on certain liquor sales slips was the defendant" s
handwriting. This, of course, was for the purpose of proving
that the defendant purchased liquor at certain stores at a
certain time. This matter, however, ceased to be in contra . .
versy in the case when the defendant"s witness Smith testi. .
fied as recorded on pages 164 and 165 of the transcript that
Chealey had bought liquor at the times and places claimed
by the State. The defendant himself on cross examination, re. .
corded on page 181 of the transcript, admitted that he
bought the two bottles of whiskey. Williams' testimony,
therefore, merely went to a point which was later admitted
by the defense, and so whether properly or improperly ad. .
mitted, cannot be said to prejudice the defendant in any way.
ARGUMENT IV
STATE"S EXHIBIT A WAS PROPERLY ADMIT. .
TED IN EVIDENCE.
State"s Exhibit A in this case was a bottle of whiskey
which was found by officers in the field adjacent to the
scene of the accident on the day following the accident. It
was the brand of whiskey purchased by the defendant in the
case which he subsequently admitted was in the car at the
time of the accident. The State"s witness Sjoblem moreover
testified that he had seen a bottle of whiskey at the scene of
the accident which to all appearances was identical with
Exhibit A. This is sufficient evidence to give some reason,..
able basis for identity and while the evidence may not have
a great deal of weight, that is a matter which should be left
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to the jury. The def·endant had, and no doubt took advan.tage of, an opportunity to point out to the jury the fact that
this evidence had very little bearing upon the case. However,
as stated above, this is a matter of weight and not of admissa.bility.
This same question was involved in the I9wa case of
State vs. Jenkins, 212 N. W. 475, in which case the defend.ant who was accused of drunken driving tipped his car over.
A bottle of whiskey was found in the vicinity of the car in
a ditch and was admitted in evidence. In this case although
there was no testimony as to the appearance of the bottle or
no testimony that the defandant had any whiskey in his car
the court upheld the admission of this evidence. See also in
this regard State vs. Tibbetts (Iowa) 22 N. E. 423.
In Hess vs. State (Ind.) 151 N. E. 405, the follow~
ing language is found:
""Apellant's motion to strike from the reoord all
·evidence pertaining to the liquor found in the stove,
pipe for the reason that there was no evidence show,
ing that this liquor belonged to appellant or that he
had any knowledge of its being there was overruled,
and this ruling is one of the causes assigned for a new
trial.* * * It seems to us the question thus pre'
sented chal1enges the weight of the evidence rather
than its admissability. The overruling of the motion
to strike out was not error.,,
In Kelly vs. State, 278 S. W. 449, the Supfleme Court
of Texas upheld the admission into evidence of whiskey
found along the bank of the creek where the defendant was
seen to walk in the direction of the creek carrying a package
and· to return without the packag•e.
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The evidence here presented, which is undisputed, is
to the effect that the defendant purchased a bottle of Gold
Bond whiskey which was in the truck with him at the time
of the accident; and that the whiskey bottle was seen at
the scene of the accident immediately after the accident oc.curred. This is sufficient certainly to give rise to an infer.ence that the whiskey picked up in the field immediately next
to the scene of the accident was the same bottle of whiskey,
and the most that can be attacked about such evidence is its
weight, and not its admissability.
ARGUMENTV
THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVI.DENCE AS TO THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
LUTHER W. SMITH AND LOTE KINNEY FO·R THE
PURPOSE OF IMPEACHING SMITH'S TESTIMONY.
The rule of law that a witness may be impeached by
the introduction of evidence as to prior conflicting statements
or conduct of such witnesses is elementary. Jones' Com.mentaries on Evidence at Section 845, 1 Ed., says:
""There is hardly any more familiar practice in
judicial procedure than that of impeaching witness.es by proof of their former statements which are in.consistent with their present testimony."
In order to introduce evidence as to such prior conflict.ing statements, it is necessary that a foundat]on be laid by
asking the witness to be impeached on cross exam,fuation
whether or not he made such statements in order that he
might have an opportunity to explain away the inconsisten.cies, if there is any explanation. In this case the district attor.-
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ney questioned the defendant, Smith, about his prior incon.sistent statements, and Smith freely admitted that he had
made these statements so that it was unnecessary for the
state to introduce evidence as to the statements. Smith'Sl
only explanation of the inconsistencies was a claim that he
had lied when making the former statements.
There are two recent Utah cases in which this court
passed upon the matter here assigned as error. In the first
of these, Buckley vs. Francis, 78 Utah 606, 6 Pac. ( 2d),
188, the court stated:
""It is an elementary rule of law that a witness
may be impeached as to testimony given upon a ma.terial issue by proof that such witness has made prior
self.-contradictory statements.,,
In State vs. Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, .44 Pac. {2d),
692 in which the defendant was charged with mayhem, oom"
mitted on his sister. .in. .law, and in which case his wife testi"
fied for him, a prior inconsistent statement of the wife to the
effect that her husband had bitten off the end of her sister's
nose, was admitted.
The defense counsel in that case objected that such tes"
timony was hearsay as to the defendant. The court stated:
""It is also objected that the conversations were
hearsay and hence inadmissable. This undoubtedly
was hearsay, but was admissable for the purpose of
impeachment, and for that purpose only. The assign"
mentis without merit."
In the case now before this court, Smith testified that
the accident occurred when the defendant drove the truck
off the road to avoid striking the oncoming car, which Smith
claimed he saw approaching them. The prior statements made
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by Smith were to the effect that he was asleep at the time of
the accident. It is obvious, therefore, that these prior state··
ments could have no effect upon the case, except to impeach
Smith's testimony, and were offered for and accepted for nc
other purpose.
ARGUMENT VI
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED DEFEND .
ANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2.
The defendant submitted a written request for an in-struction as follows:
c.c.you are instructed that the term ~.criminal neg-ligence, under the laws of the State of Utah does
not merely mean the failure to exercise ordinary care
or that degree of care which an ordinary prudent per .
son would exercise under like circumstances. It
means gross negligence. It is such negligence as
amounts to a reckless disregard of the consequences,
and of the rights and safety of others.''
Just what purpose could be served by a definition of the
term ~.~.criminal negligence,, is hard to determine in view of the
fact that the trial oourt at no place in its other instructions
used the term ~.~.criminal negligence.,, Nor is the State able
to determine from the case of State vs. Lingman, 97 Utah
180, which is relied upon by the defendant herein, that it is
necessary or proper in charging the jury in an involuntary
manslaughter case that the court must use the term ~.~.criminal
negligence.''
In Instruction No. 5 the court undertook to instruct the
jury regarding the elements of the crime of involuntary man-slaughter. An examination of the terminology used in this
instruction will reveal that the court has attempted to follow
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the terminology approv•ed by this court in State vs. Lingman,
and at nowher·e does the term ~.~.criminal negligence" appear.
Therefore, no need arises for instructing the jury regarding
the proper definition of such term. Such an instruction could
only tend to confuse the minds of the jury.
Whether or not Instruction No. 5 is in all regards in
compliance with the rules laid down in State vs. Lingman is,
of course, not before this court, as the defendant does not in
his brief make any argument regarding the pr10priety of this
instruction.
Instruction No. 5 lists five acts all of which are prohibi.ted by Title 57, R. S. U. etnd so under the ruling in the Ling.man case come under arm (a) of the involuntary manslaugh.ter statute. All of these acts with the possible exception of
No. 5c are malum in se and under the ruling laid down· in
the Lingman case will support a charge of involuntary man.slaughter when death results therefrom whether it is alleged
that they are done in a reckless and careless manner or not.
As to whether or not the court"s instruction 5C is proper we
need not discuss here as there is no evidence which was in.tr.oduced in the case from which the jury could have found
that the defendant was driving in excess of fifty miles an
hour, and the giving· of this instruction was not argued in the
defendanfs brief.
ARGUMENT VII
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
DEFENDANT"S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO.
3 AND 4.
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Defendanfs requested Instructions No. 3 and 4 are re-garding matters which are fully and completely covered in
other instructions given by the court and to assign error on
this ground would merely be quibbling over the use of words
which convey the same meaning. The attention of this court
is directed to Instruction No.6 given by the trial court. This
instruction covers the entire ground which would have been
covered by the defendant's requested Instruction No. 3
The attention of this court is also called to Instruction
No.8 given by the trial court. This instruction states the rule
of law regarding the ""reasonable prudent man doctrine" in
much clearer terms and in a light much more favorable to the
defendant than does defendant's requested Instruction No.4.
The State submits that the defendant was fairly tried
before a jury and found guilty. No proof has been made by
the defendant of any error which in any way affected his
substantial rights. The action of the trial court should there-fore be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney General,
CALVIN RAMPTON,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent.
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